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* 
Introduction 
We live in a world where global data transfers are presented as a norm; just part of life. 
Occasionally, some surprise is expressed at reactions to data transfer across countries, for 
instance when the European Parliament rejected the SWIFT Agreement
1 in February 2010, thus 
bringing to a halt the transfer of data on EU nationals’ banking transactions to the US 
authorities. Some commentators have expressed dismay at this ‘unnecessary’ move, which 
impedes the fight against financing terrorism. Others point to the problems that have arisen as a 
result of a too easy transfer of personal data across borders. 
It is important to bear in mind what is at stake in this discussion. As an illustration, Maher Arar, 
a Canadian citizen, was stopped on his return to Canada via the USA in 2002, detained, 
questioned and then sent to Syria, where he was subjected to torture for one year before the 
Canadian authorities sought his return to Canada, which was granted. According to the 
Canadian Royal Commission which examined the facts of the case, the reason Mr Arar was 
detained by the US authorities was a result of information the Canadian intelligence services 
had provided to their US counterparts, but which was unreliable. The Canadian authorities 
acknowledged their part in Mr Arar’s suffering and awarded him CAN$11 million (including 
legal fees). Subsequent investigations into other Canadians who suffered similarly as a result of 
lax rules on data sharing across borders have resulted in very substantial damages settlements as 
well.
2 The Swedish authorities permitted US and Egyptian authorities to bring a plane to 
Swedish territory and arrested and handed over to the foreign authorities two Egyptian nationals 
Amandine Scherrer, Mr Agiza and Mr Azery, both of whom had sought refugee status in 
Sweden. The authorities allowed the men to be subject to inhuman and degrading treatment, if 
not torture, on Swedish soil before being taken to Egypt. Following adverse findings by both the 
UN Human Rights Committee and the UN Committee against Torture, the Swedish authorities 
settled damages claims in respect of both men last summer.
3 
In the UK the case of Binyamin Mohammed is still outstanding in the courts. He was arrested 
by militia in Pakistan in April 2002, sold to the US forces and then tortured both in Afghanistan 
and elsewhere before ending up in the US base in Guantanamo Bay. The question for the UK 
courts is the degree of knowledge, or as some might suggest complicity, that there may have 
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been between the UK intelligence community and their US counterparts regarding personal data 
and information about Mr Mohammed during his captivity.
4 
The legal principle at stake in all these cases is the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection; two concepts that converge and diverge depending on the debate and the country in 
which they are under analysis. It is when the individual’s right to privacy is superseded by the 
state’s appreciation of a need to know about the person that problems arise. The confidence of 
state authorities in their counterparts in other states makes the sharing of this personal data 
among authorities and across borders a simple matter. In this paper I will not examine the issue 
of data sharing across borders between the public and private sectors, an issue at the heart of the 
SWIFT affair and also of the Passenger Name Record Agreements which the EU has entered 
into with Australia, Canada and the USA, and which permit authorities in those states to oblige 
private carriers in Europe to provide information about passengers to them.
5 I will focus instead 
on the difficulties inherent in the collection of personal data in the first place. 
I will also look at some of the claims that people have brought before the courts in which the 
legitimacy of state action is under scrutiny. Notably the European Court of Human Rights 
decision in S & Marper v UK, where a supranational court finds the UK’s maintenance of 
sensitive biometric data in its police database unlawful on the basis of privacy. Here the 
contention spills over the framework of democracy within sovereignty into the field of 
international human rights, where an individual is able to claim human rights against the state. 
Research questions: 
1.  Where is privacy located? 
2.  Who defines privacy? 
3.  What are the principles of privacy? 
4.  What is necessary in a democratic society? 
5.  What is the role of supranational and national courts in determining the meaning of privacy 
and for whom? 
The challenges around privacy 
The question of privacy rose to the top of the EU agenda at the beginning of 2010 for a number 
of reasons and from a number of sources. On the one hand, on 11 February 2010, the European 
Parliament rejected an interim agreement prepared by the EU Council and the US authorities 
that would have enabled agencies in the EU to continue to provide information to their US 
counterparts on all electronic bank transfers in Europe. The result was that the continued supply 
of this information to the US authorities was no longer lawful. The US authorities issued a press 
release expressing their disappointment and insisting on the importance of the information for 
anti-terrorism measures. The reason for the European Parliament’s negative vote was the 
potential impact of the agreement on the privacy of EU citizens. The Parliament considered that 
the lack of satisfactory safeguards for the right to privacy made the proposed agreement 
unacceptable. 
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On the other hand, the EU’s own Data Retention Directive,
6 which requires telephone and 
internet operators to collect and store information on telephone, mobile phone and internet 
messages within the EU so that it can be available for law enforcement purposes, began to run 
into serious trouble in the national courts in the EU. Two member states, Ireland and Slovakia, 
asked the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 2006 to annul the Directive on the grounds that 
there was a fundamental error regarding the legal basis. The ECJ refused to do so in a judgment 
in February 2009,
7 so the member states continued their rather tortuous national implementation 
of the measure. The Romanian Supreme Court found against the national implementing 
legislation in October 2009. Then the German Constitutional Court struck down its national 
implementing legislation on 2 March 2010.
8 In both cases it was the relationship of the intrusive 
nature of the legislation on the individual’s right to privacy that was central to the decisions. 
The German court was particularly concerned about the purpose of the collection and storage of 
the data, which was precautionary in nature, that is to say not directed at events that had already 
taken place but at some future possible action or event. It found that retention of such data must 
not lead to the possibility to virtually reconstruct any activities of citizens. It found that it is a 
central element of Germany’s constitution that citizens’ activities in enjoyment of their rights 
and liberties cannot be subject to total capture and registration.  
In the meantime, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has also been active on the 
question of privacy. On 4 December 2008, it handed down judgment against the UK regarding a 
law enforcement database that includes various items of biometric data on individuals.
9 It found 
that the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention of fingerprints, cellular 
samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected but not convicted of offences failed to strike a 
fair balance between the competing public and private interests, and that the UK had 
overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this regard. Further, it found that the 
retention of the data constituted a disproportionate interference with the applicants’ right to 
respect for a private life and could not be regarded as necessary in a democratic society (para 
125). This is strong stuff indeed from an ECtHR that is sometimes criticised for mincing its 
words. 
The contestation revealed by the events cited above is characterised first and foremost by a great 
curiosity by states to know more about people, both those living on their territory and farther 
afield, as the SWIFT affair indicates. All the issues relate to state authorities seeking more 
information about people, claiming a right to retain that information for periods it determines 
and to use the material in the future in ways not yet defined. In these cases, a common theme, as 
commented upon by the German court, is that the information is valuable in itself. State 
authorities are not seeking the information in order to find out who committed a crime. Rather 
they want the information stored and available for future use so that they can reconstruct the 
individual’s activities virtually and follow him or her through databases that depict time and 
reveal events. Gary Marx has described this as the toast and freeze approach – information is 
toasted into a fixed form reflecting a specific moment, frozen in a database and when wanted, 
pulled out and toasted again. All the different bits of information may be toasted up and placed 
together, giving the impression of recreating the whole loaf of bread. But of course, it looks 
nothing like a loaf of bread – the processes through which the information has passed create a 
completely different data profile to the individual from whom they were first extracted.
10  
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Further, in the European context, the state’s curiosity finds a new home in the European Union 
– the use of supranational measures to justify interferences which might be problematic to sell 
to home parliaments. The German court admonishes its national government suggesting that it 
must take the message to the European Union that precautionary and causeless data retention is 
by definition problematic for the right of privacy. However, just as the debate moves to the EU, 
the contestation does so as well. The European Parliament rejects the rather casual sharing of 
sensitive financial data of anyone with an active bank account in the EU with the US authorities 
with very limited and hard to enforce protections for the individual, but broad scope for sharing 
with US authorities and contractors. The European Court of Human Rights finds the UK 
authorities have overstepped the individual’s right to privacy in retaining biometric data in a 
database. At the centre of the struggle are the research questions set out above. We will follow 
them through this study, trying to reveal the tensions and the solutions which the judicialisation 
of the right to privacy provides to them. 
Where is privacy located? 
The constitutions of many EU states include a right to privacy. A right to both privacy and data 
protection is included in the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is now binding in all 
member states (with certain limitations in Poland and the UK).
11 This duty applies to the EU 
institutions and the member states’ authorities equally. It is the judicialisation of the right to 
privacy that is of particular interest to us here. Who is entitled to determine the scope of the 
right to privacy or what is an unacceptable interference with it? What is the limit on the state 
authorities’ claim to authority regarding the collection, retention and use of personal data? To 
answer these questions the relationship between state authorities and their national courts and 
supranational courts is central. They are charged respectively with the protection of the national 
constitution, including the delivery of constitutional rights to persons and protection European 
human rights contained in the ECHR. When faced with claims relating to privacy and data 
protection, the courts must decide whether the state’s interest, which is based on a claim of 
responsibility for collective security, takes priority over the person’s claim to privacy and the 
fair handling of his or her data in the name of individual security. For the 47 Council of Europe 
countries the building block of supranational privacy rights is Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights states: 
Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.  
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right 
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in 
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  
The right to privacy is one that finds a source outside national constitutional law in a regional 
human rights instrument. Of course, the ECHR is not the only regional or international human 
rights instrument to include a right to privacy. This can also be found, for instance, in the UN’s 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), but what makes the ECHR 
different as a source is the ECtHR. Unlike the ICCPR and other international human rights 
instruments, the existence of a court beyond the state that is charged with interpreting the 
instrument against the action of state parties changes the power relationship between the state 
and the individual. It takes the ultimate decision on what is privacy and whether it is being 
protected out of the control of state authorities, including national courts. 
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The facts of the Marper case 
The Marper judgment shows just how important the escape from the national jurisdiction and 
the authority of the state can be. In the case there are two applicants, Mr S who was arrested at 
the age of eleven and charged with attempted robbery. His fingerprints, cellular samples and 
DNA were taken. He was acquitted but his biometric data continued to be held in the UK’s law 
enforcement database. The other applicant, Mr Marper, was arrested and charged with 
harassment of his partner. His fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA were also taken and 
added to the law enforcement database. Before even a pre-trial review, Mr Marper and his 
partner were reconciled and the charges were dropped. His biometric data were retained, 
however, in the database. The UK authorities refused to remove the biometric data from the 
database. The UK’s Police National Computer, which contains the database, is governed by 
national law which is quite opaque and allows substantial discretion to the police. Their 
guidance provides for various degrees of access to personal data, easier access to that of persons 
convicted and more restricted for those who have not been. Time periods of retention range for 
5 – 35 years, but the UK courts are not obliged to exclude data which should have been 
destroyed but was not, from being used as evidence in trials.
12 
Who defines privacy? 
The UK authorities stated that the retention of biometric data in a law enforcement database was 
not an interference with the right to respect for private life. The UK courts agreed with the UK 
authorities. Only at the final instance, in what is now the UK’s Supreme Court, did one of the 
judges (Baroness Hale) suggest that actually retaining both fingerprints and DNA data 
constituted an interference by the state with a right to private life. Accordingly, a justification 
was needed for the action, and here the judge was fully satisfied that there was sufficient 
justification. 
The ECtHR disagreed. It considered at length what ‘private life’ is according to its own 
jurisprudence. It found that there was not an exhaustive definition. By so doing, it allowed itself 
in the future to widen the meaning of the term should it consider this necessary. Thus the 
definition remains not only with the ECtHR but it remains an open question and one capable of 
being a site of further contestation. However, the ECtHR did find that private life can embrace 
multiple aspects of the person’s physical and social identity. These include: 
•  Gender identification; 
•  Name; 
•  Sexual orientation; 
•  Sexual life; 
•  Personal identification and linking to a family; 
•  Health; 
•  Ethnic identity; 
•  Personal data revealing racial origin; 
•  Personal development; 
•  The establishing and developing of relationships with other human beings and the outside 
world; 
•  A person’s image. 
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In light of such a wide range of issues held by the ECtHR to be part of private life, it is not 
surprising that it did not agree with the UK government or its courts about the question of 
whether retaining biometric data on a database is an interference with private life. It found that 
the mere storing of data relating to the private life of an individual amounts to an interference, 
within the meaning of Article 8 ECHR. This is independent of how the information might 
subsequently be used. The ECtHR found that all three categories of personal information –
fingerprints, DNA profiles and cellular samples constitute personal data. Taking each category 
of data separately, the court examined its impact as regards the question of private life. Starting 
with cellular samples, it noted that it had already held that the systematic retention of this 
material constituted an interference with the right to a private life.
13 Although the UK 
government sought to change the ECtHR’s mind on this, the attempt was not successful. The 
ECtHR, notwithstanding the opinion of the UK authorities, maintained its jurisprudence that in 
light of the highly personal nature of cellular samples their retention must be included as an 
aspect of privacy. Such samples could, for instance, reveal information about the individual 
including his or her health, it reasoned.  
On DNA profiles, the ECtHR noted that less personal information was available from them than 
from cellular samples. Nonetheless, the ECtHR held that these too are part of private life 
because the substantial amounts of unique personal data which they obtain go well beyond 
neutral identification. It noted that DNA profiles can be used to establish family relationships 
and genetic links among people, thus their retention is indeed an interference with the right to 
private life. 
As regards the third category of data, fingerprints, it was agreed that these hold less personal 
data than the other two. Here the ECtHR had previous case law of its own which indicated that 
holding fingerprint data is not an interference with private life. In an exceptional move, the 
ECtHR chose to change its jurisprudence on this point. It considered that fingerprint records 
constitute personal data in much the same way as personal photographs or voice samples. As in 
respect of the latter, the ECtHR has provided protection, in so far as it has held that fingerprint 
data should be brought into line: 
fingerprints objectively contain unique information about the individual concerned 
allowing his or her identification with precision in a wide range of circumstances. They 
are thus capable of affecting his or her private life and retention of this information 
without the consent of the individual concerned cannot be regarded as neutral or 
insignificant. (para. 84). 
While it held that the retention of cellular samples and DNA profiles had a more important 
impact on private life than fingerprints, nonetheless, the retention of fingerprints constitutes an 
interference with the right to respect for private life. This means, for instance, that the EU’s 
database of asylum seekers’ fingerprints is caught by the new interpretation of Article 8 ECHR, 
as they are personal data. 
Once the ECtHR has spoken there is no room left for the national authorities to argue. They are 
obliged to accept that it is the ECtHR that ultimately has the last word on what constitutes a 
private life. However, just because an element is constituted as part of private life does not 
mean that state authorities are prohibited from interfering with it. It simply means that the 
authorities must justify their interference. What changes is that instead of simply acting in 
respect of such elements as the state authorities consider best serves the public interest, the 
action has become interference. Thus they are obliged publically to justify why they are 
interfering with the elements that have become part of privacy. The justification must 
correspond to those permitted by Article 8 ECHR itself. 
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What are the principles of privacy? 
For an interference with privacy to be justified, it must first be in accordance with the law. But 
the definition of the law is once again a matter for the ECtHR, not the national authorities. So 
although national authorities may declare that they have a law that is adequate for the purpose 
of justifying an interference with the right to privacy, it is for the ECtHR to decide whether the 
legislation that the state puts forward fulfils the requirements of law according to the court’s 
definition. Here the ECtHR reviewed its jurisprudence on what is law (thus identifying what is 
not law). The key feature of law is that is must be adequate and foreseeable. In other words, it 
must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual to regulate his or her 
behaviour and conduct. To meet this threshold it must afford adequate legal protection against 
arbitrariness and indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of discretion of the authorities. 
Further, in so far as a margin of discretion is left to state authorities, the manner in which 
discretion is exercised must also exclude the arbitrary. The precision required from national law 
depends on the instrument under consideration, the field it covers and the number and status of 
the persons to whom it is directed. Once again, the ECtHR leaves itself substantial scope for 
defining what is law. 
Regarding the UK’s police computer, the ECtHR found that it is essential for law to fulfil the 
definition that in respect to the retention of personal data (specifically in the three categories 
which were under consideration in the case) it includes detailed rules governing the scope and 
applications of measures, as well as minimum safeguards including: 
•  Duration; 
•  Storage; 
•  Usage; 
•  Access by third parties; 
•  Procedures for preserving the integrity and confidentiality of data; 
•  Procedures for its destruction. 
These safeguards are necessary to guarantee against the risk of abuse and arbitrariness. On the 
facts of the UK’s case, the ECtHR did not make a finding as to whether the national law was 
entitled to be termed a ‘law’. Instead it went on to consider whether there was a legitimate aim, 
since without a legitimate aim the interference with private life will never be justified. Here, 
however, the ECtHR has no trouble finding a legitimate aim: the detection, and therefore the 
prevention, of crime. There is an important temporal linking that the court carries out. The 
legitimacy is in the detection of crime and only via that route can it be for the prevention of 
crime. One has the impression that at least some voices in the court were perhaps concerned 
about the shift towards the detection of crimes which have not yet been committed or indeed 
might never be committed. 
The taking of personal data from the individual, the court accepted, was for the purpose of 
linking the person to a particular crime where there is suspicion against him or her. The 
retention raises the rather delicate broader purpose of assisting in the identification of future 
offenders. The court does no more than mention, and then passes over, this aspect, which 
perhaps deserves much more attention. The reason for this is that the retention of data for the 
identification of future offenders means that one is reading backwards from the future an event 
that ineluctably will take place. Bigo calls this the “Future Perfect”, an event in the future but 
for the purposes of the present justification has already happened. 8 
What is necessary in a democratic society regarding privacy and 
surveillance? 
Next is the question of how the ECtHR deal with its relationship to democracy. This is 
unavoidable as Article 8 itself requires the court to reject any interference with privacy that is 
not justified as “necessary in a democratic society”. The assessment of democratic necessity is 
expressly placed on the court’s shoulders in the full knowledge that the 47 countries which are 
members of the Council of Europe are such because they have been accepted as democracies. 
The court begins by reminding us of the relationship of proportionality with democracy: 
an interference will be considered ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for a legitimate 
aim if it answers a ‘pressing social need’ and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the 
legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify 
it are ‘relevant and sufficient’. 
This is quite a shopping list of elements to assess. While we have already dealt with the 
legitimate aim of the measure the court still invites consideration of: 
•  Pressing social need; 
•  Proportionality of the action in light of the aim; 
•  The relevance and sufficiency of the state authorities’ justifications. 
The final word on all of these counts will be the decision of the court, not that of the national 
authorities. However, the state authorities are, according to the court left what is called a 
‘margin of appreciation’. This margin will vary depending on factors which the court sets out 
(though they are not definitive): 
•  Whether the right at stake is crucial to individual’s effective enjoyment of intimate or key 
rights; 
•  Whether a particularly important facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake. 
If either or both of these aspects are present then the state has a narrow margin of action. If they 
are not the state’s action will be assessed against a wider margin of appreciation. In determining 
the two factors that widen or narrow the state’s margin, the court indicates that what is central is 
the extent to which there is a consensus within the member states of the Council of Europe (all 
47 of them). This will be both as regards the relative importance of the interest or how to protect 
it best. One way the court deals with the problem of contested democracy is through an 
assessment of what other states accepted as democratic by the Council of Europe do in respect 
of the same issues. However, to answer its questions, in the first place the court goes is to the 
ECHR itself. It repeats Article 8 which is, in its opinion, irrefutable evidence of the fundamental 
importance of the right to respect for privacy. Because Article 8 constitutes the consensus of 
democratic states, appropriate safeguards for the protection of personal data must be in place.  
The next source of democratic legitimacy that the court uses is the Council of Europe’s 
convention on automatic processing of personal data (1981). What it is effectively doing is 
maintaining that the other Council of Europe conventions relevant to the issue form a coherent 
part of the assessment of democratic legitimacy. This means that all the treaties of the Council 
of Europe form part of the basis for the assessment of democracy. The third step the court takes 
is beyond the treaties to the Recommendations of the Council of Europe’s Committee of 
Ministers. It takes Recommendations R(87)15 and R(92)1 on the use of personal data in the 
police sector as evidence of the consensus of what is necessary in a democratic society in 
Europe. This provides more clarity on the safeguards that must be in place for data, specifically 
where it is sensitive, revealing, for instance, genetic make-up. 
The ECtHR then refers back to its round-up, set out earlier in the judgment, of the law and 
practice in other Council of Europe member states and its comments regarding the inconsistency 9 
of the rules within different parts of the UK. In that earlier section, it noted that 20 member 
states stored DNA information on national databases and the number is increasing. But it noted 
that in most of those countries the DNA information is not taken in a systematic manner but 
limited to specific circumstances and/or to more serious crimes (punishable by imprisonment). 
According to the ECtHR’s study, only the UK expressly permits the systematic and indefinite 
retention of DNA profiles and cellular samples of persons who have been acquitted or in respect 
of whom criminal proceedings have been discontinued. Five states require such information to 
be destroyed on acquittal or discontinuance (Belgium, Hungary, Ireland, Italy and Sweden) 
while ten others allow for further retention only in most exceptional circumstances. At this point 
in the judgment the court also has regard to the EU rules on data protection (Directive 95/46) 
and the Prüm Convention of 2005 (entered into by some member states and then transformed 
into an EU Council Decision in 2008) which provide for time limits on the retention of personal 
data.  
The message seems to be that democratic legitimacy can be assessed first, through the Council 
of Europe treaties and Committee of Ministers’ Recommendations. Secondly, it will examine 
the practices in other Council of Europe countries. Thirdly, the inconsistencies within the state 
itself regarding data protection are a source of information regarding necessity in a democratic 
society. 
The court then applies the agreed principles to the case. It accepts that the retention of 
fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles may in general be regarded as justified within 
the ECHR. It limits its assessment to whether the retention of such information regarding people 
who have been suspected but not convicted of a criminal offence is justified. To do so it sets out 
the key principles of data protection: 
•  Proportionality to the purpose for collection; 
•  Limitations on periods of storage; 
The court’s justification for these two central planks is the Council of Europe Convention and 
the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendations.  
•  The gravity of the crime and the existence of a conviction. 
The justification here comes from norms across the Council of Europe states and the 
inconsistencies within the UK – Scotland has a system which is less oppressive and corresponds 
to the Committee of Ministers’ Recommendation R(92)1. Although the court recognises the UK 
authorities’ claim to the efficiency of having a large database, it uses against the UK its claim to 
be ground-breaking for the Council of Europe in this regard. If the UK claims such a position, 
according to the court, it carries a particularly heavy burden to ensure that private life is 
respected. The efficiency argument of the UK authorities is presented, in the judgment, as 
questionable on the basis of other academic work that casts some doubt on it. The court notes 
the authorities’ own argument on efficiency is undermined by the fact that DNA samples taken 
from suspects are most matched with existing DNA profiles from earlier crimes, thus the 
temporal relationship is with past crimes and present suspects not present suspects and future 
crimes.  
In finding against the UK authorities, the court specifically condemns two aspects of the UK’s 
use of biometric data: the blanket nature of collection and the indiscriminate nature of retention. 
The catalogue of problems looks like this: 
•  Blanket and indiscriminate retention; 
•  No proportionality between offence and retention; 
•  No age limits; 10 
•  No time limit to retention irrespective of the offence; 
•  No scale of difference depending on the category of data engaged. 
The ill the court identifies is that of stigmatisation. The retention of the data interferes with the 
presumption of innocence. This is because convicted and acquitted people are treated in the 
same way. While the court accepts that retention of data is not the same as the voicing of 
suspicions, the indefinite holding of data places them in the same category as the convicted 
person. These concerns are even stronger in relation to minors. The result is that the court finds: 
In conclusion, the Court finds that the blanket and indiscriminate nature of the powers 
of retention of the fingerprints, cellular samples and DNA profiles of persons suspected 
but not convicted of offences, as applied in the case of the present applicants, fails to 
strike a fair balance between the competing public and private interests and that the 
respondent State has overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation in this regard. 
Accordingly, the retention at issue constitutes a disproportionate interference with the 
applicants' right to respect for private life and cannot be regarded as necessary in a 
democratic society. This conclusion obviates the need for the Court to consider the 
applicants' criticism regarding the adequacy of certain particular safeguards, such as 
too broad an access to the personal data concerned and insufficient protection against 
the misuse or abuse of such data. 
Conclusions 
The Stockholm Programme, the new five-year plan for the development of the Justice and 
Home Affairs area, requests that the Commission 
explore if and how authorities of one Member State could obtain information rapidly 
from private or public authorities of another Member State without use of coercive 
measures or by using judicial authorities of the other Member State.
14 
Similarly, it calls on the Commission to  
examine how operational police cooperation could be stepped up, for example as 
regards incompatibility of communications systems and other equipment, use of 
undercover agents, and, where necessary, draw operational conclusions to this end.
15 
In carrying out these activities, the Commission will have regard to the ECtHR jurisprudence 
and ensure that its actions do not encourage or attempt to justify breaches of the individual’s 
right to privacy through exchange of fingerprints, cellular samples of DNA among law 
enforcement authorities where even the retention of such samples is contrary to the ECHR. This 
is even more important when it comes to the transfer of data from the authorities of one state to 
another – the obligation to ensure that there are satisfactory controls over what data is being 
shared with whom and for what purposes is critical. 
Finally, the Lisbon Treaty has made the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights legally binding and 
of equivalent status to the EU treaties themselves. The Charter contains at Articles 7 and 8 both 
a right to respect for private and family life equivalent to Article 8 ECHR (in respect of which 
the UK came unstuck in S & Marper) and a right to the protection of personal data. People in 
the EU now have a right not only to privacy but also to protection of their data, which includes 
protection from its too casual transmission to the authorities of other countries. 
                                                      
14 Stockholm Programme, Council Doc 5731/10, 3 March 2010, .p 40.  
15 Ibid., p. 69. 